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Introduction 
 
 
New Centre-Right Government in Finland 
Economic and European Challenges and Perspectives 
Tobias Etzold and Paweł Tokarski 
Finland is directly affected by two of the biggest crises in the history of European 
integration: the troubles of the euro and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The new Finnish 
government, formed by the liberal Centre Party, the populist Finns Party and the con-
servative National Coalition Party, faces major economic, foreign policy and security 
challenges, but fundamental change in its policy towards the EU and the eurozone is 
not to be expected. The coalition’s stability will depend not least on whether it embarks 
upon urgent structural reforms, and whether or not they are successful. The outcome 
of the reform process will also affect Finland’s political influence within the European 
Union and the situation of the German-led coalition of the most competitive eurozone 
members. 
 
Juha Sipilä’s liberal Centre Party emerged 
the winner of the Finnish parliamentary 
elections held on 19 April 2015, with the 
conservative National Coalition Party of 
outgoing Prime Minister Alexander Stubb 
and Timo Soini’s populist Finns Party close 
behind. It is these three parties that have 
formed the new centre-right coalition. The 
main issue in the election campaign was 
the precarious state of the Finnish economy, 
which finds itself in its weakest phase since 
the severe structural crisis of the early 1990s. 
Thanks to its model economy, Finland 
was long regarded as a poster child of the 
Union and became one of Germany’s closest 
partners in the euro crisis. But massive eco-
nomic problems now threaten the country’s 
influence and standing, especially after it 
lost its AAA credit rating in October 2014 – 
which had put Finland in the elite circle of 
financially strong EU states. 
Finland’s EU Policy: Pragmatically 
Firm and Constructive 
Since joining the European Union in 1995, 
Finland has been regarded as the most pro-
EU and integration-friendly of the Nordic 
states. Helsinki has never demanded opt-
outs, and participates fully in all EU policies. 
It introduced the euro in 2002, as the only 
Nordic country yet to do so. Overall, Fin-
land’s EU policy can be characterised as 
flexible, pragmatic and constructive. Despite 
its peripheral situation in north-eastern 
Europe, the country has worked to gain 
acceptance in the inner circle of the Euro-
pean Union. In particular, its accession to 
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the third stage of Economic and Monetary 
Union in 2002 was driven by that wish, 
alongside economic rationale. Finland’s 
political elite believed that the best channel 
through which to pursue national interests 
was active and constructive participation in 
EU decision-making processes. EU member-
ship also contributed to economic recovery 
after the recession of the early 1990s. 
Finland was quick to introduce its own 
initiatives in the EU framework. Through 
the policy of the Northern Dimension, 
Helsinki sought to build bridges between 
the EU member states, the then accession 
candidates (the Baltic states and Poland), 
and Russia, and to embed its interest in 
good neighbourly relations with Russia in 
a European context. Its pragmatic bilateral 
relationship with Moscow makes Helsinki a 
central actor in matters concerning Russia. 
But Finland’s relations with Russia have 
also darkened in the course of the Ukraine 
crisis. Although the Finnish economy is di-
rectly affected by the EU sanctions imposed 
on Russia and Russia’s counter-sanctions, 
Helsinki backed the EU sanctions after ini-
tial doubts. The latest developments con-
cerning Ukraine have set new accents in 
the debate over Finland’s national security 
and defence capability. In its defence policy 
Finland is seeking to close ranks with its 
Nordic neighbours, the European Union 
and NATO, and is openly discussing the 
option of joining NATO (see SWP Comment 
25/2015). 
Since 2011, the European economic 
and financial crisis and the influence of the 
populist Finns Party have injected a more 
EU-sceptical tone into the debate on Europe 
– even in Finland. This growing scepticism 
has had immediate effects on Finnish 
Europe policy and Helsinki’s stance in EU 
negotiations. 
During the euro crisis, Finland often 
adopted more radical positions than Ger-
many, and pressed hard for action on reform 
and budget consolidation. Helsinki’s image 
as a “Euro-hawk” was underlined in 2011 
and 2012, when it made participation in 
bailout packages conditional on collateral. 
Helsinki also vehemently rejected any 
moves towards communitisation of euro-
zone debt, fearing that this would blunt 
the will to carry through reforms in the 
crisis countries. 
As well as observing that Finland is “more 
German than the Germans” on fiscal con-
solidation and reforms, another aspect of 
particular interest to Berlin should not be 
underestimated. The Finns have successively 
earned a reputation as credible and stable 
partners who clearly articulate their politi-
cal preferences in talks and adroitly place 
their own candidates behind the levers of 
economic power in Brussels. For example, 
Olli Rehn became one of the key figures 
in the euro crisis as Commissioner for Eco-
nomic and Monetary Affairs between 2010 
and 2014. 
Fraught Economic Situation 
But now Finland requires crisis therapy of 
its own. The decline of traditional motors 
of growth – Nokia and the timber and paper 
sectors – has hit the Finnish economy hard, 
with the sanctions imposed on Russia by 
the European Union and Russia’s counter-
sanctions exacerbating economic woes. Ger-
many is now the largest market for Finnish 
exports, with Russia dropping from first 
to third place after the volume of imports 
from Finland fell by 14 percent in 2014. The 
severe structural problems of the Finnish 
economy demand deep reforms; tinkering 
will not suffice. But to date none of the par-
ties has presented a convincing concept. A 
package of social and healthcare reforms 
introduced by the old government was de-
feated in parliament in March 2015. In May 
2015 the European Commission ruled that 
Finland had exceeded the deficit and debt 
criteria of the EU Treaty. The Commission 
sees Finland’s public finances endangered 
by a “high sustainability risk in the medium 
term” due to the “budgetary impact of the 
cost of ageing”. Price competitiveness has 
also been weakened by unit labour costs 
rising more quickly than in many other 
European countries since 1999. 
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The new Finnish government thus 
faces numerous difficult decisions. It must 
reduce public spending, which as a pro-
portion of GDP is among the highest in the 
OECD. But this may be difficult to accom-
plish, because the governing parties hold 
different positions. There is also a danger 
of budget consolidation having a negative 
effect on growth. On the other hand, the 
Finnish economy possesses a string of loca-
tional advantages in comparison to other 
members of the currency union. In inter-
national rankings of the innovativeness and 
quality of tertiary education and vocational 
training Finland occupies top places. In 2013 
Finland’s level of investment in research 
and development was the highest of any EU 
member state (3.3 percent of GDP). 
These economic difficulties, and com-
parisons with the flourishing economy in 
neighbouring Sweden, regularly stoke pub-
lic discussion about whether to remain in 
the eurozone. But the risk of Finland leav-
ing is presently small. On the other hand, 
a Greek exit or default would burden all the 
members of the eurozone with additional 
costs. Opposition to the euro in Finland 
could grow, as could scepticism towards 
future rescue packages or deeper economic 
integration. 
Instead of Timo Soini, who questions 
current EU bailout policies and had been 
tipped for the post, Alexander Stubb was 
appointed finance minister. He is an ex-
perienced pro-European, but his latitude 
is constrained by the new government’s 
announcement of cuts in state spending 
of €4 billion by 2019, which will hit social 
programmes especially hard. Given that 
Sipilä may have to agree compromises that 
are unpopular at home, the new govern-
ment is likely to take a harder line in new 
negotiations with Greece. The opposition 
of both the Centre Party and the Finns Party 
to negotiations over a new rescue package 
increases the complexity of the ongoing 
talks with Athens. Altogether, conflicts 
between the three governing parties can 
be expected over Finland’s future eco-
nomic, EU and eurozone policies. Some 
of the positions of the Euro-sceptic Finns 
Party are miles apart from those of their 
considerably more EU- and euro-friendly 
coalition partners, the Centre Party and 
the National Coalition Party. 
Finnish-German Cooperation 
To date Berlin and Helsinki have shared 
similar ideas about the reforms that need 
to be made in the Economic and Monetary 
Union. And as far as national responsibility 
for domestic economic policy is concerned, 
the Finnish position is very similar to the 
German. Both countries also share the same 
scepticism towards a mutualisation of 
national debt. 
But there are also differences. Helsinki 
would like to simplify EU fiscal rules and 
narrow the latitude enjoyed by the Euro-
pean Commission. After France and Italy 
received mild treatment from the European 
Commission with Berlin’s tacit approval, 
Helsinki fears unequal treatment of smaller 
eurozone members. The new Finnish govern-
ment stresses national accountability for 
economic and budget policy and favours 
reinstating a strict “no-bailouts” principle. 
Helsinki also rejects treaty reforms, which 
it regards as unnecessary and politically 
risky, more clearly than does Germany. Fin-
land’s line is that a new legal and institu-
tional framework is not needed; the exist-
ing rules suffice, and merely need to be 
observed properly. 
But on other economic matters within 
the EU, Germany can count on Helsinki, 
especially when it comes to preserving the 
“four freedoms” and deepening the internal 
market. This will be important in the fore-
seeably tough talks with the British. Fin-
land explicitly supports the new free trade 
agreement with the United States (TTIP). 
Germany in turn hopes for support from 
Finland, as a fellow net payer, in the up-
coming negotiations over a new EU multi-
annual financial framework (2021–2027). 
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Union Needs Finnish Influence 
The new Finnish government will have to 
make difficult political decisions, and faces 
a litmus test that will determine its cred-
ibility within the eurozone. Finland has 
always demanded its partners make deep 
structural adjustments when they have 
needed financial support. Should Helsinki 
prove incapable of carrying through similar 
reforms of its own, this would not only harm 
its reputation in the eurozone but also 
weaken the German-led coalition pressing 
for structural reforms. The other EU mem-
ber states should observe closely what eco-
nomic reforms Finland pursues and whether 
they turn out to be successful. Many of the 
challenges facing the Finnish economy are 
also replicated elsewhere: declining competi-
tiveness, lack of growth impulses, an over-
dimensioned public sector, comparatively 
high labour costs, and population ageing. 
Consequently, Finland’s reform process 
can supply useful insights for reforms in 
other eurozone countries. If Finland’s eco-
nomic reforms turn out to be successful, 
that will strengthen its position and influ-
ence in the European Union. Its influence 
would increase still further if the new gov-
ernment upheld the country’s constructive 
approach in EU and eurozone negotiations. 
With respect to pragmatic dealings with 
Russia, the Union can also continue to profit 
from Finland’s experience. The new govern-
ment, for its part, has stated that it will 
abide by the Union’s policy towards Russia, 
but will also seek to maintain diverse bilat-
eral relations with its eastern neighbour. 
It remains to be seen what role the new 
foreign minister and avowed eurosceptic 
Timo Soini will play in future Finnish policy. 
After his nomination, Soini said that Fin-
land was committed to membership, but the 
Union must reform. He will, he said, remain 
a critical friend of the European Union. 
While there may be uncertainties about 
the new government in Helsinki, a strong 
supporting voice from Finland is of great 
importance in a phase of European inte-
gration that will be decisive for the future 
of the eurozone and EU-Russia relations. 
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